/ w) H) `$ K' X" S2 C+ ^& x5 ~Standard: ' m+ a6 v1 G$ \& a% uIEC 61010-1:1990' U u) ?' z* E, ?& o3 q
+A1:1992+A2:1995 ) W; g* U& O1 S3 xSub clause:6 u% a( Q9 N, ?7 \) B9 N
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Sheet n. 295 2 t) k1 ~2 w$ }4 C& i0 _: EPage 1(1)1 ~/ l5 K* g& p
Subject:0 Y) Z6 r# P8 H. j) m
Object % Z7 \! \' L! ]" E* ?: N: P8 aKey words: 7 n- g9 |/ A# t% T; [$ @8 Y3 R: C- Scope + \' P2 V( s' b: {& X# X- Software Safety " D& A! Y. A8 I# Y3 {/ a9 YDecision taken by* e! {" b$ x+ {( I0 h, z4 s) ]
ETF3 and confirmed9 B( B' D0 }6 q) U" G, C
by CTL at its 38th # z) r- @1 W* X Y, zmeeting, in Toronto # S4 j* r L6 A! [ C4 sQuestion:2 k9 c% G2 \5 s- B5 N
If safety is dependent on Software, what criteria do laboratories employ to ensure 9 H! F2 r0 D' e% T! H3 U% ?" C5 ?compliance?6 B* a( y- A+ g
Decision:) |; q" N, q/ `5 S$ [ k
Software safety is not specifically addressed in IEC 61010-1 at present and therefore, there 8 {( ~% S% k5 l: g/ xare no specific guidelines for this work. A draft collateral standard is in preparation and also; @4 c' U) V* f- k& R
IEC 61508 deals with this topic. 0 o1 M) ~7 c+ b- |6 V: p3 {; [) CGenerally, it is advised that devices should not be dependent on software alone for their # s/ ^- d9 }% asafety. There should be a separate independent means provided which acts to prevent a , f) Y3 t G! Fdangerous condition arising.) ~1 M# F9 x {. f
Explanation:; L+ M7 w4 H6 d S( O
Experience shows that the analysis of software systems to ensure their safe operation is very' D$ t- k; T% z! a W
difficult and in practice, can only provide a measure of confidence. Additionally, the. R; S% F& L. s" S/ [9 g. v# V
methods of performing the examination are not widely agreed upon and therefore, subject to 5 O. n0 L3 m; ]' l. \! H& U% tdoubt. In these circumstances, it is preferred to adopt safety limit methods known from ) W7 K8 g+ I7 }0 n' Dexperience to be effective. . h/ h# q1 E) Q) Y$ U/ ?+ l: i0 D+ |& e6 ]
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DSH 295